The Jurisprudence of Antitrust
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Antitrusting of Patentability
Deciding a patent’s validity is costly, and so is deciding it incorrectly. Judges and juries must expend significant resources in order to reach a patent validity determination that is properly informed by the relevant facts. At the same time, patent validity determinations reached quickly and cheaply may conserve resources today while creating future costs. Wrongly preserving an invalid patent...
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The evolution of U.S. Supreme Court antitrust jurisprudence over the past fifty years is well known. As one of us has written, “[f]orty years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court simply did not know what it was doing in antitrust cases.”1 The Court interpreted the Sherman2 and Clayton Acts3 to reflect a hodgepodge of social and political goals, many with an explicitly anticompetitive bent, such as prote...
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In the course of damning the market giant Standard Oil, the Supreme Court declared that the purpose of the Sherman Antitrust Act is to prevent "monopoly and the acts which produce the same result as monopoly." The Constitution's Supremacy Clause, in turn, requires preemption-that is, non-enforcement-of state laws that conflict with a federal statute. Put together, these propositions suggest tha...
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Some digital business models may be so innovative that they overwhelm existing regulatory mechanisms, both legislation and historical jurisprudence, and require extension to or modification of antitrust law. Regulatory policies that were developed in response to 19th or 20th century antitrust concerns dealt principally with economies of scale leading to monopoly power, and may not be well suite...
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An Offer You Can’t Refuse: Naked Exclusion, Refusal to Deal, and Exclusive Contracts Robert Kulick1 We introduce a model of anticompetitive exclusive dealing that provides a unified treatment of two of the major categories of potentially anticompetitive single-firm conduct recognized by the FTC: refusal to deal and exclusive purchase agreements. The exclusionary mechanism succeeds by turning th...
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