3 Carl Hempel , " Two Models

Vii. Comparative Inductive Logic § 87. Hempel's Analysis of the Concept of Confirming Evidence

Some interesting investigations by Hempel concerning the concept of ~on­ firming evidence are here discussed. Hempel shows correctly that two wIdespread conceptions are too narrow: Nicod's criterion (the law fall swans are white' is confirmed by observations of white swans and only by these) and th.e prediction-criterion (a hypothesis is confirmed by given evidenc~ if and only If one part of th...

Studies in the Logic of Explanation

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How to Study Scientific Explanation?

This paper investigates the working-method of three important philosophers of explanation: Carl Hempel, Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon. We argue that they do three things: (i) construct an explication in the sense of Carnap, which then is used as a tool to make (ii) descriptive and (iii) normative claims about the explanatory practice of scientists. We also show that they did well with respec...

Opening the Door to Cloud-Cuckoo-Land: Hempel and Kuhn on Rationality

Opening the Door to Cloud-Cuckoo-Land: Hempel and Kuhn on Rationality A reading is offered of Carl Hempel's and Thomas Kuhn's positions on, and disagreements about, rationality in science that relates these issues to the debate between W.V. Quine and Rudolf Carnap on the analytic/synthetic distinction.

The Philosophy of Logical Positivism