Herding in Multi-winner Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
Herding behavior is widely observed in auctions. There are rational reasons for herding but herding can also be counterproductive. We found evidence of herding behavior and sub-optimal outcome in a multi-winner auction setting. This study adds to the knowledge of herding by looking at herding in an auction setting where there is extra incentive to herd (multi-winner auction). Our findings reconfirm evidence in previous research about strategic usage of herding that diminishes after certain threshold; in addition, our findings indicate sub-optimal outcomes of herding behavior which include unjustified risk-return ratio, low ROI, wasted investment opportunities, and underutilized resource.
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