Cooperation between self-interested agents in normal form games
نویسنده
چکیده
We study how to achieve cooperation between two self-interested agents that play repeated randomly generated normal form games. We take inspiration from a model originally designed to identify cooperative actions by humans who play a game, but we use the model in a prescriptive rather than descriptive manner. To identify cooperative intent, agents use a particle filter to learn the parameters of the model.
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