Power in Voting Games and Canadian Politics
نویسنده
چکیده
In this work we examine power measures used in the analysis of voting games to quantify power. We consider both weighted and non-weighted voting games giving simple examples of each. The power indices considered are the Shapley-Shubik [8] index, the Banzho index [1], the Penrose [7] index and Coleman [2] indices. We apply them to speci c examples taken from recent Canadian parliaments and to the work from [6], where the proposed Canadian constitutional amendment scheme from 1971 was examined using the Shapely-Shubik index. Results illustrate both the difculties in quantifying power in real political systems as well the insight provided by these power indices.
منابع مشابه
A THEORY OF VOTING GAMES AND THE POWERIND PROGRAM 1. Voting games 2. Power indices 3. Weighted voting games 4. Voting in the European Council 5. How to use POWERIND
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