Mixed equilibria are unstable in games of strategic complements
نویسندگان
چکیده
In games with strict strategic complementarities, properly mixed Nash equilibria— equilibria that are not in pure strategies—are unstable for a broad class of learning dynamics. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- J. Economic Theory
دوره 118 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2004