Cognitive strategies take advantage of the cooperative potential of heterogeneous networks

Understanding the emergence and maintenance of cooperation is one of the most challenging topics of our time. Evolutionary game theory offers a very flexible framework within which to address this challenge. Here we use the prisoner’s dilemma game to investigate the performance of individuals who are capable of adopting reactive strategies in communities structurally organized by means of Barabási–Albert scale-free networks. We find that basic cognitive abilities, such as the capability to distinguish their partners and act according to their previous actions, enable cooperation to thrive. This result is particularly significant whenever fear is the leading social tension, as this fosters retaliation, thus enforcing and sustaining cooperation. Being able to simultaneously reward fellow cooperators and punish defectors proves instrumental in achieving cooperation and the welfare of the community. As a result, central individuals can successfully lead the community and turn defective players into cooperative ones. Finally, even when participation costs—known to be detrimental to cooperation in scale-free networks—are explicitly included, we find that basic cognitive abilities have enough potential to help cooperation to prevail. 4 Author to whom any correspondence should be addressed. New Journal of Physics 14 (2012) 063031 1367-2630/12/063031+14$33.00 © IOP Publishing Ltd and Deutsche Physikalische Gesellschaft