A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this note we show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that “solutions” to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as predictions of what would be “resting points” for a game in the way stable coalition structures are usually interpreted.
منابع مشابه
A modified position value for communication situations and its fuzzification
Myerson treated various situations of cooperation in the field of cooperative games and proposed the communication structure. In this paper, we define and characterize an allocation rule in terms of the position value, called an average spanning tree solution, for communication situations by introducing a concept of cooperation relationship which says that two players are deemed to possess this...
متن کاملStable Coalition Structures under Restricted coalitional changes
In this paper, we examine whether farsighted players form the e¢ cient grand coalition structure in coalition formation games. We propose a stability concept for a coalition structure, called sequentially stability, when only bilateral mergers of two separate coalitions are feasible because of high negotiation costs. We provide an algorithm to check the sequential stability of the grand coaliti...
متن کاملStability of Coalitions in Belief-Based Non-Transferable Utility Games
Coalition stability is an important concept in coalition formation. One common assumption in many stability criteria in non-transferable utility games is that the preference of each agent is publicly known, so that a coalition is said to be stable if there is no objections by any sub-group of agents according to the publicly known preferences. However, in many applications including some softwa...
متن کاملHedonic coalition formation games: A new stability notion
This paper studies hedonic coalition formation games where each player’s preferences rely only upon the members of her coalition. A new stability notion under free exit-free entrymembership rights, referred to as strong Nash stability, is introducedwhich is stronger than both core and Nash stabilities studied earlier in the literature. Strong Nash stability has an analogue in non-cooperative ga...
متن کاملObtaining a possible allocation in the bankruptcy model using the Shapley value
Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is an effective tool for supporting decision-makers to assess bankruptcy, uncertainty concepts including intervals, and game theory. The bankruptcy problem with the qualitative parameters is an economic problem under uncertainty. Accordingly, we combine the concepts of the DEA game theory and uncertain models as interval linear programming (ILP), which can be app...
متن کامل