S ome implications of antitrust laws for cartel pricing *
نویسنده
چکیده
Price dynamics are characterized for a price-fixing cartel. Antitrust laws reduce cartel prices even though cartel detection occurs with probability zero. In response to cheating, the non-collusive price gradually moves from the collusive price to the static Nash equilibrium price. 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
منابع مشابه
Equilibrium Cartel Pricing in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority∗
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