Exploitation and Disadvantage

Some accounts of exploitation, most notably the degradation-based account provided by Ruth Sample (2003) and Robert Goodin’s (1987) vulnerability-based account, argue that persons are exploited when the benefit they receive from a transaction falls below a certain threshold value. According to these accounts, the duty of the advantaged party to constrain their advantage in light of the other party’s disadvantage is independent from the historical cause of that disadvantage. Rather, it is justified by a direct appeal to the other party’s disadvantage. They argue that a failure to discharge these duties amounts to exploitation. Because the duty of constraint in these accounts does not depend on the reason for the disadvantage the duty is what I call a ‘come-what-may’ duty. I show that come-what-may duties create moral hazards that can be exploited by the disadvantaged parties. In such cases these accounts of exploitation are either self-frustrating or over-demanding. I conclude that there is a tension between ‘come-what-may’ duties and fairness. This tension leaves accounts that contain come-what-may duties unable to provide a coherent analysis of exploitation when the concept is understood to involve taking unfair advantage.