The Ethics of Genetic Engineering

This paper seeks to examine the ethical questions surrounding the intentional manipulation of genes to achieve phenotypic modifications in humans. It is not concerned with distributive justice or the ethics of research, but rather with the debate over whether the technology of genetic engineering itself, once it is to a reasonable level proven both safe and effective, is ethical to use. The study begins by motivating the discussion and introducing some key concepts related to the technology. After establishing the scope and structure of the analysis, the paper proceeds by reviewing the most commonly presented arguments against genetic engineering and demonstrating that all fail to establish a legitimate ethical basis upon which such a criticism could stand. Finally, the paper concludes with a short discussion outlining possible areas for further study and discourse. Daniel J. Choi 2 INTRODUCTION: MOTIVATING THE DEBATE Though its origins can be traced back to the humble pea pods of a 19 century Augustinian priest, genetic engineering remains a fairly recent technological development. Since the confirmation of DNA’s role in heredity in 1952 and the discovery of the double helix structure of DNA just one year later, research in the field of genetics has advanced at an ever-increasing rate, finally reaching the incredible level at which its application can legitimately be termed the engineering of genes. Recent studies have confirmed the ability to directly and purposefully manipulate genes, the material responsible for myriad human characteristics ranging from the mundane (like eye, hair, or skin color) to the ultimately life-changing (such as genetic diseases and predispositions to other illnesses). Though the technology to do so safely and effectively has not yet been developed, the realization of true genetic engineering may not be too distant in the future. These scientific discoveries could not have been made at a more fortunate time. Never in its history has mankind been more aware of the need for effective therapy for genetic diseases. Though in many developed countries the amount of suffering due to infectious diseases and nutritional deficiencies has decreased, the incidence of genetic diseases, which are not as easily prevented or treated by traditional means, remains high. One figure places inherited disorders as a major factor in up to 50 per cent of childhood deaths worldwide. Furthermore, 15% of congenital disorders can be traced to the errors of single genes. The World Health Organization estimates that two single-gene defects that result in sickle cell disease and thalassemia account for more than 200,000 deaths per year and 100 million carriers of the diseases. To those suffering under the burden of such disorders, genetic engineering may provide salvation. It is highly debated issue, however, whether genetic engineering should be the answer to these ills. The fact remains that while genetic engineering has many entirely altruistic ends, it could 1 Wright. 2 West (1988). 3 Fletcher (1983), Daniel J. Choi 3 potentially be used to modify virtually any aspect of any living creature, a fact that causes some to reject its use on ethical grounds. Erwin Chargaff, a biochemist whose two eponymous rules helped lead to the discovery of the double helix DNA structure, warns, “The technology of genetic engineering poses a greater threat to the world than the advent of nuclear technology.” The fact that the use of genetic engineering is such a contentious issue means that the ethics of its application must be discussed now while time remains to establish any safeguards or regulations deemed necessary for its safe and ethical use. SCOPE: SETTING BOUNDARIES This study is concerned specifically with the ethical arguments in support of or against the intentional manipulation of genes to achieve phenotypic modifications in humans. To ground the analysis it attempts to separate rationally based concerns from irrational fears caused by the novelty and unknowns of genetic engineering. This requires two things. First, the paper will assume that the technology exists in a reasonably safe and effective form, and second, it will disregard questions of distributive justice. The first assumption is formed in an attempt to avoid dystopian arguments based solely on hypothetical worst-case scenarios, which prophesize the destruction of humanity at the hands of genetic engineering. While it is true these speculative situations paint a bleak portrait of a future that could conceivably (albeit improbably) come to pass, the development and application of this technology will be incredibly gradual, enough so that if humankind observes itself heading such a direction, there will still be a reasonable amount of time in which to switch courses for the better. The second point is made in order to avoid drifting into the similar, yet completely separate debate over how to best ensure equal access to genetic engineering technology. To focus on issues of distributive justice would be to 4 Chargaff’s rules state that the DNA of any living cell should have a 1:1 ratio of purine and pyrimidine base pairs– that is, adenine and thymine should be equal in number and the same is also true of guanine and cytosine. 5 One additional type of argument against genetic engineering that is not included in this analysis is that which follows from a set of theistic principles, as these points rely on specific views of God that are not necessarily universally shared and certainly not based in fact. Daniel J. Choi 4 neglect the fundamental question of whether its application should be aspired to in the first place. By sufficiently condensing the scope of its ethical investigation, this paper has laid the groundwork to probe more deeply into the remaining relevant issues from which it can derive conclusions. FRAMEWORK: STRUCTURING THE ANALYSIS Prior to continuing the investigation, one relevant distinction between two different forms of genetic engineering will be useful to make, largely because the ethical discourse surrounding genetic engineering tends to be divided along this line. Two different methods exist by which scientists can alter genetic material – somatic genetic engineering and germline genetic engineering. Somatic cells, or regular body cells such as muscle cells and brain cells, contain 23 chromosomal pairs and their genetic material is not passed onto children. On the other hand, germline cells, or the reproductive egg and sperm cells, contain 23 unpaired chromosomes with DNA that are passed onto all future generations. The ethically relevant difference lies in the perpetual inheritance by successive generations of genetic changes to germline cells. In an attempt to most efficiently prove the ethical statuses of both these methods, this paper builds its analysis upon two important postulates. First, it maintains that the burden of proof rests upon critics of genetic engineering. This follows quite reasonably from the fact that opponents of this technology rest their cases upon the ontologically positive claim of the social ills that may ensue from its use, whereas the proponents of genetic engineering cite the direct application of the technology as their 6 In an attempt to address these concerns, however, this paper presents a couple plausible distribution schemas. Utilizing a Rawlsian perspective, the upper class with greater access to genetic engineering technology could be limited in their pursuit of enhancement insofar as they are able to improve the situation of the least well-off class. Other distribution schemas could involve lotteries for genetic modifications or requiring that the wealthy seeking enhancements subsidize treatment for the poor. Perhaps such regulation would not even be necessary. Channeling Adam Smith’s theory of the invisible hand, Simon Young argues, “Economic growth in a market economy increases the prosperity of the poor, as well as the rich. As the techno-industrialized nations become ever more wealthy, so the poorest members of society will enjoy ever-increasing accessibility to the benefits of biodesign” (Young 62). Society tolerates many inequalities today (those of wealth, intellect, etc.), and it does not follow that genetic engineering would result in inequalities of a different nature. Furthermore, an increase in unjust inequalities due to technology is not adequate to discourage the development of genetic engineering. Though the wealthy were likely the first to benefit from the invention of the computer, this does not present a valid reason for not building the computer. Daniel J. Choi 5 support. In other words, genetic technology will necessarily and directly reduce human suffering due to genetic disorders, while any negative external consequences that result from its application appear only in hypothetical scenarios. Second, the paper argues that somatic genetic engineering is strictly less ethically contentious than germline genetic engineering – that is, for any situation in which it is ethically acceptable to use germline genetic engineering, it is also ethically reasonable to use somatic genetic engineering. To illustrate this point, consider an example with two people, Jack and Jill, who each wish to alter their genetic material via somatic and germline genetic engineering, respectively. The nature of the alterations they seek is irrelevant, but for the sake of comparison, let their desired changes be similar. Now, in order to facilitate the ethical comparison, imagine that all of Jack’s descendants also opted to undergo the same somatic genetic modifications. In this example, both somatic and germline genetic engineering produce identical consequences, and the only difference between the two cases rests in the fact that each of Jack’s descendants were given the choice to opt into the treatment while Jill’s descendants were not. Regardless whether the genetic manipulations are made to cure a disease or enhance a trait, it cannot be ethically justified that giving people some sort of choice is worse than not giving them a choice. Therefore, somatic genetic engineering is at least as ethical as germline engineering. Upon the foundation of the two conjectures established above, by proving unjustifiable all currently existing arguments against germline genetic engineering, this investigation will be able conclude that both germline and somatic germline engineering are ethically permissible within the current set of presented facts and arguments. 7 The direct application of genetic engineering is to modify the genetic material in humans in a beneficial way. Note that concerns about its risks are not ethically relevant, as this paper concerns itself only with a safe and effective version of the technology. Challenges to the ethics of genetic engineering must instead call upon external ramifications not directly related to its application. Admittedly, not every argument against genetic engineering will be refuted here, as such a task would fall outside the scope of this paper. A significant and relevant subset of the arguments, however, will be addressed. Daniel J. Choi 6 DEBATE: TO WHAT DEGREE IS GENETIC ENGINEERING ETHICAL? This section seeks to develop and refute many commonly held arguments against germline engineering, including those that are also used to argue against somatic engineering. Critics of germline genetic engineering typically focus on social and moral problems that could arise from its application. Though such arguments generally rely upon the construction of hypothetical, albeit theoretically plausible circumstances, some of the concerns they raise do seem to have an ethical basis, and for that reason they need to be addressed. One of the most well-known arguments involves the issue of consent. This position holds that changing the genetic material that is transmitted to one’s offspring violates the basic ethical principle that an individual must provide consent in order to permit change in or experimentation with his or her person. While the principle of informed concern is a standard, widely accepted criterion upon which to base ethical conclusions, its relevance to the argument at hand seems dubious at best. The unfortunate truth is that children, regardless of whether their parents engage in genetic engineering, never truly reserve the right to consent to their genetic composition. Sandel agrees that this argument “wrongly implies that absent a designing parent, children are free to choose their characteristics for themselves.” Furthermore, parents are generally very paternalistic in other ways that do not often incite ethical inquiry, controlling significant factors of development like a child’s education and environment without their consent. In response, one could explain this apparent discrepancy by attempting to draw a distinction between the aspects of life that a child can assume control over when he or she matures and the aspects of life that a child can never change. The idea is that manipulating the former group of aspects without consent would be acceptable while doing so with the latter would not be. This binary, however, also fails in that genetic engineering could still reasonably fit in the acceptable category shared by the examples of determining a child’s environment or education. As genetic technology continues to 9 Sandel, (2004). 10 Ibid. Daniel J. Choi 7 become safer, more effective, and more accessible, it is very likely that a child, upon reaching adulthood and finding herself unhappy with her genes, could choose to modify her own genetic composition. In fact, upon further scrutiny the principle of consent fails altogether as a binary in the context of determining the genetic composition of a child. Parents inherently exert power over their children’s genes in choosing only certain mates for reproduction. Though this too, in essence, is genetic manipulation without consent, one would be hard pressed to find anyone who would object to reproductive freedom on such ethical grounds. Given that the principle of consent fails to establish an adequate distinction between what is ethically acceptable and what is ethically deplorable, it would make sense to discard this doctrine for another more appropriate principle upon which to support an ethical argument against genetic engineering. Departing from the principle of consent, perhaps the real factor influencing the intuitions of opponents of genetic engineering is specificity. A rule of specificity might propose that there is an ethical difference between selecting a mate with traits that one might want to pass down to future generations and selecting which specific traits a child should possess. This raises two common arguments against genetic engineering – the killing of parental love and the issue of inviolability. The first argument raised by specificity posits that manipulating genes with the aim of influencing specific traits will destroy the institution of unconditional love between parents and children. While the tradition of parental love is certainly an important ethical objective – just imagine a world in which parents simply abandoned all unruly children – it is not realistic to believe that the application of genetic engineering to alter a child’s traits will undermine this powerful natural instinct. Nick Bostrom writes, “What relevant evidence we have, for instance regarding the treatment of children who have been conceived through the use of in vitro fertilization or embryo screening, suggests that the pessimistic prognosis is alarmist. Parents will in fact love and respect their children even when artificial