OSTROM WORKSHOP RESEARCH SERIES PAPER Governing a layered territory: overlapping property rights and the mismatch of incentives in Afro-Brazilian Territories

Significant advances have taken place in the recognition of property rights in areas of occupied by local and indigenous communities, particularly in tropical forest areas known for their conservation value. In the Brazilian Amazon, for instance, these areas correspond to 44% of the region today. The figure is even higher for areas of remnants of Atlantic forest along the Southern coast of the country. As a result, complex mosaics of property rights are evolving whereas one observes both overlaps and mismatches between rights regulating land rights, ecosystems, and specific resources and species. In this paper, we use Schlager & Ostrom's (1992) bundles of property rights concept and Yandle's (2007) mismatch of property rights to analyze how overlapping property systems and related institutional arrangements affect the incentives to manage common property resources in tropical forests. In particular, we examine the case of the Afro-Brazilian (Quilombola) territories in the Atlantic Forest. We take a Social-Ecological Systems approach to examine the type and degree overlaps and mismatches across three levels: Quilombola territories (governance system), forest (resource system), and the Euterpe edulis palm tree (resource unit). The Euterpe edulis palm tree is an emblematic conservation species for the Atlantic Forest. It is highly appreciated as a food source, and it demands high prices in informal markets throughout the region. For decades, the conservation movement has coalesced around protecting the palm against illegal extraction. Yet, the Euterpe edulis economy has not followed a path of domestication and intensification as other palm trees in the Amazon, such as the Euterpe oleraceae (açaí) or other extractive resources (Brondizio 2008) Homma 1993). Nor it has been adequately preserved in public protected areas, or been successfully managed in commonly held land, as suggested by (Ostrom 1990). Instead, and in spite of efforts, it continues to follow a tragedy of the commons path as predicted by (Hardin 1968). To examine this puzzle, in addition to our analysis of bundles of rights, we use the Ostrom Design Principles to evaluate the underlying governance conditions at each level of analysis: the territory, the forest resource system, and the Euterpe palm resource unit. We argue that the layered structure of property rights has diffused the sense of ownership of the resource without providing effective mechanisms for assuring compliance to rules and monitoring of the resource. These arrangements are also limiting the ability of Quilombola residents to effectively develop management plans that reconcile conservation and development goals. Note: preliminary version to be presented at the Ostrom Workshop Research Series on March 2nd 2016. Comments and suggestions are welcome. Please do not cite without permission. 2