Magnus Jiborn

A classical problem in political theory is how to explain unpopular and oppressive minority rule. How can a small minority manage to dominate a much larger population against its will? How come the oppressed majority does not revolt? Two rival approaches can be distinguished: the coordination theory, according to which the power of the minority rests on coordinated action among the minority and lack of coordinated resistance among the majority (Hardin 1995), and the theory of ideology, commonly attributed to Marx, according to which the power of the dominant minority is due to false consciousness, i.e. false beliefs or moral ideals that support the oppressive power structures, among the majority (Rosen 1988; Fluxman 2005). This paper provides a defence of the coordination theory. Ideology and coordination are not incompatible however. Rather, I suggest, coordination theory provides a general framework that explains the role of false beliefs and moral norms in supporting oppressive power structures. Introduction: the silence in Sing-Sing. In May 1831, Alexis de Tocqueville and his travelling companion, Gustave de Beaumont, visit the prison Sing-Sing at the Hudson River in the State of New York. Tocqueville is on a grand journey to study the young American democracy. Together with Beaumont, however, Tocqueville is also working on another project: a report for the French government on the American penitentiary system(Beaumont and Tocqueville 1970). In Sing-sing they meet a scene that makes a deep impression on both of them. Outside the prison walls, Tocqueville and Beaumont can see several hundred prisoners cutting stone in a quarry, unchained and with only a small number of guards to watch them. “The prisoners are free” Tocqueville notes in his diary, “they are armed [working tools], have no chains and are kept in by no walls. An act of simultaneous determination on their part would infallibly set them at liberty.” (Tocqueville 1981) Still, prisoners are working “as energetically as workmen paid for the job.” (Tocqueville 1981) How is this possible? Why don’t the prisoners revolt? “It is evident”, Tocqueville and Beaumont write in their report, “that the life of the keepers would be at the mercy of the prisoners, if material force were sufficient for the latter.” So why, they ask themselves, “are these nine hundred collected malefactors less strong than the thirty individuals who command them?” (Beaumont and Tocqueville 1970) The secret, they find, is silence. All communication between prisoners is strictly prohibited, 24 hours a day, and any transgression of the prohibition immediately and severely punished. Hence discipline is preserved, they conclude, “because the keepers communicate freely with each other, act in concert, and have all the power of association; while the convicts separated from each other, by silence, have, in spite of their numerical force, all the weakness of isolation.” (Beaumont and Tocqueville 1970) The scene described by Tocqueville and Beaumont illustrates quite elegantly, I think, both a classical puzzle in political theory and a possible solution to that puzzle. The puzzle is the paradox of oppression: how is it possible for a small minority to dominate and rule a large majority against its will? How come the oppressed majority does not revolt? The solution that the story points to is a certain theory of power: the so called coordination theory, or perhaps even “dual coordination theory” of power (Hardin 1995). In common language it is known as the principle of divide and rule. According to it, political power rests on the coordinated action of the ruling minority and the lack of coordinated resistance among the ruled majority. As long as the majority does not succeed to launch a unified revolt, the argument goes, the ruling minority can concentrate its force against any isolated attempt at opposition and hence, in spite of its numerical inferiority, succeed to keep the majority in check merely by threat of punishment. A rival view is the so called ideology theory, commonly attributed to Marx. Proponents of the ideology theory deny that coordination problems and threat of sanctions are sufficient to explain the persistence of oppression. Instead, they hold that the fact that an oppressed majority does not revolt when it is clearly in its interest to do so can only be explained if the majority is in some sense subject to “false consciousness” that serves to support existing power structures. The aim of the present paper is to defend the coordination theory. Ideology and coordination are not incompatible, however. In fact, I will claim, since beliefs are essential in coordination problems, coordination theory provides a useful framework that allows us to account for the role of ideology in upholding oppressive power structures. I will consider three different kinds of false consciousness that may support and strengthen an oppressive minority regime that rules by coordination power – first, false beliefs about the strength and determination of the ruling minority, or about the level of resistance among the majority, second, false beliefs about the legitimacy of the regime, and third moral norms of obedience – and try to show how these fit with the coordination model. In response to an argument by Tony Fluxman (Fluxman 2003; 2004), I will suggest that allowing a role for false consciousness in this sense is consistent with coordination theory. This explains why oppressive regimes often devote large resources to propaganda an empirical fact that, according to Fluxman, speaks against coordination theory as a general account of oppressive power. However, although false consciousness may facilitate oppressive power, it is only secondary in the sense that it results from and depend on coordination power rather than being an independent source of power.