Can Deterrence Lead to Fairness?

نویسندگان

  • Riccardo Alberti
  • Atulya K. Nagar
چکیده

On the other hand, game theory has its own ethical basis deriving from utilitarian morality, whereby an action cannot be judged by itself, but only its consequences define its moral value. Though Schelling warns the researchers about this simplistic conception of morality, in its most speculative examples, game theory, embraces the definition of utility from the utilitarian tradition. One may argue, as Schelling does, that a moral calculation could be at the foundation of particular allocation of payoff values or could explain why psychological tests strongly diverge from theoretic result; therefore the issue of ethical foundations in game theory is not exhaustively resolved by the utilitarian view. It is nonetheless incontrovertible that game theory has no meaningful applications when the actors are not interested in the consequences of their actions or when the final purpose of a game goes beyond the information comprised in the payoff functions.

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تاریخ انتشار 2013