Selfish Routing in Social Networks
نویسنده
چکیده
I investigate the intersection of selfish routing and the preferential attachment social network. In particular, through the use of a stochastic generative preferential attachment model, a collection abstract network patterns are created for the transfer of flow from one distinct source destination vertex pair. Then, using a linear approximation method, I calculate both Nash and system optimal flows in such networks. Theoretical results are formulated as to discuss the usefulness of studying selfish and system optimal routing under such environments. Furthermore, through extensive simulation, empirical results are presented that both support previous research in selfish routing and establish novel relationships between the preferential attachment model, price of anarchy and prevalence of the Braess paradox.
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