Lobbying and Information in Politics
نویسنده
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Pluralistic View of Politics: Asymmetric Lobbyists, Ideological Uncertainty and Political Entry
In a spatial common agency model, two asymmetric interest groups (principals) inuence a unique decision-maker (agent). The decision-maker chooses a onedimensional policy on behalf of those principals and has private information about his ideology after contracting with principals. The policy is always e¢ cient and reects a weighted average between the principals and the agents ideal points....
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Abstract Connecting to rule-makers in order to set favorable rules (lobbying) or paying government executives to bend the current rule (bribing) are the two main strategies for influencing government. This study in an evolutionary game model explain why bribing may become widespread while other states like compliance and cooperative lobbying are Pareto superior. The theoretical model is used ...
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