Analysis of Peer-to-peer Service Provider in Queuing Networks

In this paper, we anatomize incentive structures in peer assisted services with multiple content providers and focus on stability issues from two different angles: stability at equilibrium of Shapley value and convergence to the equilibrium. We first define a coalition game in a peer assisted service with multiple content providers by classifying the types of coalition structures as separated, where a coalition includes only one provider, and coalescent, where a coalition is allowed to include more than one provider. We show that the Shapley payoff scheme may lead to unstable coalition structure and propose a different notion of payoff distribution scheme, value, under which peers and providers stay in the stable coalition as well as better fairness, is guaranteed. In peer-assisted services, the ―symbiosis‖ between providers and peers are sustained when: the offered payoff scheme guarantees fair assessment of players’ contribution under a provider–peer coalition and each individual has no incentive to exit from the coalition. We present three examples stating the problems of the non-cooperative peer-assisted service: the peers are underpaid compared to their Shapley payoffs; a provider paying the highest dividend to peers monopolizes all peers and Shapley value for each coalition gives rise to an oscillatory behavior of coalition structures. Our objective in this paper is to analyze the incentive structure of peer-assisted services when the worth of coalition is feasible and super additive.