Two Versions of an Argument for Particularism

In the article two versions of an argument for particularism are presented and discussed. The first has Avicenna as originator; Donald Mertz is the originator of the second version. While the first version takes for granted a reduction of polyadic attributes, the second does not. In fact, Mertz vehemently rejects the reduction. The article ends with an attempt to make it plausible that Mertz’s analytic ontology implies intensional determinism. If the implication is valid, it constitutes something of a reductioargument against the theory. 1. Particularism: Overview The doctrine that attributes appear as individuals is an element of a rather heterogeneous group of analytic ontologies. In order to avoid misunderstandings, the name of this general doctrine should be selected with care. One name, which is quite in vogue nowadays, is ‘trope theory’. Besides being a bit clumsy, it is potentially misleading. This is due to a tendency among those who call themselves ‘trope theorists’ to reject universals entirely. Since there are also realists who recognise the existence of individual attributes, a more neutral name of the general doctrine is needed. ‘Particularism’ as well as ‘instance ontology’ seem to be sufficiently neutral. As names of individual attributes, terms such as ‘attribute instance’ or just ‘instance’ therefore seem to be better choices than ‘trope’. Alternatives are ‘unit attribute’, ‘unit property’ and ‘unit relation’. With the exception of ‘trope’, all of these terms will be used indiscriminately in the present article. This is not least motivated by the fact that it is the analytic ontology of Donald Mertz which I take a particular interest in here. The term ‘trope’ is absent in his works. Instead he makes use of the other terms mentioned. He has a prediliction though for ‘unit relation’ and ‘relation instance’. 1 A better term would be ‘tropism’. Nobody seems to have made use of it though.