Voting on Public Pensions with Family Bargaining
نویسنده
چکیده
The paper develops a voting model for public pensions based on the assumption that families can coordinate their voting. A family profits from a public pension program if its retired members receive more benefits than the working members pay in taxes. Given a pay-as-you-go budget constraint, net gains accrue to families with above-average ratios of retirees to voters. A majority of voters will belong to such families and thus favor public pensions, if enough retirees have a suitable number of working-age relatives—not too few and not too many. * Department of Economics, University of California Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA 93106, USA; and CESifo. Phone: 1805-893-4532. E-mail: [email protected]. http://www.econ.ucsb.edu/~bohn. An earlier version of this paper circulated under the title “A Static Model for Voting on Social Security.”
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