Preference aggregation and game theory
نویسنده
چکیده
1 Non-strategic point of view Arrow Harsanyi and utilitarianism Interpersonal comparison of utilities 2 Strategic aspects and game theory Strategic voting, and G-S " Small worlds " Computational issues 3 A broader picture Great confusion under the sky: excellent situation! To put the cart before the horses Non welfarist approaches F. Patrone Preference aggregation and GT Non-strategic point of view Strategic aspects and game theory A broader picture Arrow Harsanyi and utilitarianism Interpersonal comparison of utilities Summary 1 Non-strategic point of view Arrow Harsanyi and utilitarianism Interpersonal comparison of utilities
منابع مشابه
Social Choice Theory, Game Theory, and Positive Political Theory
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تاریخ انتشار 2010