Minimal Assumptions for E¢ ciciency in Asymmetric English Auctions
نویسنده
چکیده
I introduce a property of players valuations that ensures the existence of an ex post e¢ cient equilibrium in asymmetric English auctions. The property is weaker than the one in Echenique and Manelli (2006) and is similar to that in Birulin and Izmalkov (2003). Relative to this latter paper and the work of Krishna (2003), the use of this property has the advantage of yielding the desired results without assuming di¤erentiability of valuations or that signals are drawn from a density.
منابع مشابه
Asymmetric English Auctions Revisited
I introduce a property of players valuations that ensures the existence of an ex post e¢ cient equilibrium in asymmetric English auctions. The use of this property has the advantage of yielding an ex post e¢ cient equilibrium without assuming di¤erentiability of valuations or that signals are drawn from a density. These technical, non economic, assumptions have been ubiquitous in the study of ...
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