Joyce’s Argument for Probabilism
نویسنده
چکیده
James Joyce’s ‘Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism’ gives a new argument for the conclusion that a person’s credences ought to satisfy the laws of probability. The premises of Joyce’s argument include six axioms about what counts as an adequate measure of the distance of a credence function from the truth. This paper shows that (a) Joyce’s argument for one of these axioms is invalid, (b) his argument for another axiom has a false premise, (c) neither axiom is plausible, and (d) without these implausible axioms Joyce’s vindication of probabilism fails.
منابع مشابه
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