A new interpretation of the Nash bargaining solution : fictitious play ∗
نویسنده
چکیده
We provide a new interpretation of the Nash bargaining solution, using fictitious play. Based on the finding that the Nash demand game has the fictitious play property and that almost every fictitious play process and its associated belief path converge to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the Nash demand game (In, 2014), we present two initial demand games which exactly and approximately implement the Nash bargaining solution. JEL Classification: C71, C72, C78.
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