An empirical evidence of winner's curse in electronic auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
Winner’s curse theories in case of (almost) common-value auctions have long been in existence and fiercely debated in the economic literature. The implications of this theory are far reaching for the fast emerging electronic auction markets. Businesses can make strategic uses of the auction markets ranging from estimation of demand curve for their products to achieving individual price discrimination and liquidating their inventory at the highest possible price. However, the implications of the possible existence of winner’s curse are far reaching for both businesses and consumers. In this paper, we seek to investigate the existence of winner’s curse and establish its determinants.
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