Wage Indexation, Central Bank Independence and the Cost of Disinflation
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چکیده
Recently, Fischer [1996] and Posen [1998] demonstrated empirically that countries with less independent central banks enjoy lower output losses during disinflationary cycles. Since independence is presume to provide a credibility bonus to the monetary policy, this conclusion looks surprising. To explain their paradoxical result, these authors put forward that independent central banks probably face a flatter short-run Phillips curve. In this paper, we provide a formal demonstration of this point. More precisely, we demonstrate that the private sector has less incentive to index its nominal wages when the central bank is granted with a large amount of independence. Since an increased indexation steepens the short-run Phillips curve, our result is consistent with the view that where central bank independence is greater, the cost of disinflation is higher. Our empirical tests, for a sample of 19 OECD countries, support our theoretical analysis. In particular, a negative and significant relationship is found between indexation and independence. Résumé Fischer [1996] et Posen [1998] ont récemment démontré empiriquement que les pays dotés des banques centrales les moins indépendantes payaient moins cher, en terme réels, leurs épisodes désinflationnistes. Dans la mesure où l’indépendance des banques centrales est supposée fournir un supplément de crédibilité à la politique monétaire, cette conclusion est surprenante. Afin d’expliquer ce résultat, ces auteurs soulignent que les banques centrales les plus indépendantes sont probablement celles qui font face aux courbes de Phillips de court-terme les plus plates. L’objectif de cet article est de fournir une démonstration formelle de ce point. Plus précisément, nous démontrons que les salariés sont moins incités à indexer leurs salaires nominaux lorsque la banque centrale est caractérisée par une large autonomie. Dans la mesure où un accroissement de l’indexation salariale se traduit par une courbe de Phillips de court-terme plus verticale, notre résultat est compatible avec le fait que les politiques monétaires désinflationnistes sont plus coûteuses dans les pays où les banques centrales sont les plus indépendantes. Nos tests empiriques, pour un échantillon de 19 pays membres de l’OCDE, semblent corroborer notre analyse théorique. En particulier, une relation négative et statistiquement significative est mise en évidence entre l’indexation et le degré d’indépendance des banques centrales.
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تاریخ انتشار 2000