Evolutionary dynamics for bimatrix games: a Hamiltonian system?
نویسنده
چکیده
We review some properties of the evolutionary dynamics for asymmetric conflicts, give a simplified approach to them, and present some new results on the stability and bifurcations occurring in these conservative systems. In particular, we compare their dynamics to those of Hamiltonian systems.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Journal of mathematical biology
دوره 34 5-6 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 1996