The MC-value for monotonic NTU-games

The MC-value is introduced as a new single-valued solution concept for monotonic NTU-games. The MC-value is based on marginal vectors, which aze extensions of the well-known marginal vectors for TU-games and hyperplane games. As a result of the definition it follows that the MC-value coincides with the Shapley value for TU-games and with the consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games. It is shown that on the class of bargaining games the MCvalue coincides with the Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. Furthermote, two characterizations of the MC-value are provided on subclasses of NTU-games whích need not be convex valued. 1'his allows (or a comparison between the MC-valuc and the egalitarian solutiou introduced by Ralai and Samet (1985). 'Department of Econometrics and CentER for Economic Research, Tilburg Univeteity, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, the Netherlands "CentER for Economic Research, Tilburg University, and Department of Mathematics, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem 91904, lsrael