Non - global social contracts : A note on inefficient social institutions *
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper explores some perverse features that can emerge when social contracts are moved from a social vacuum to a setting of social interdependence. In particular we note incentives that might exist in conjunction with externality problems that yield situations in which: (1) social contracts reduce social wealth; (2) sub-global social contracts are Pareto inferior to the absence of social contracts; (3) there are no incentives for global social contracts. While previous works emphasized the benefits of contracts, this paper focuses on their costs. A conclurion reached is that perhaps justice and efficiency demand not a single global social contract but rather a rich melange of sub-global contracts with appropriate interstices
منابع مشابه
Government Size and Social Capital in Developing Countries; New Empirical Evidence
Social capital is one of the most important subjects in development economics. It has a crucial role in development process in developing countries. To the best of our knowledge, there is no study about the importance of government size in social capital. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is considering the relationship between government size and social capital in 109 developing countries d...
متن کاملYour Call Could not be Completed as Dialled: Why Truth Does not Speak to Power In Global Health; Comment on “Knowledge, Moral Claims and the Exercise of Power in Global Health”
This article contends that legitimacy in the exercise of power comes from the consent of those subject to it. In global health, this implies that the participation of poor country citizens is required for the legitimacy of major actors and institutions. But a review of institutions and processes suggests that this participation is limited or absent. Particularly because of the complex political...
متن کاملAssessing Social Costs of Inefficient Procurement Design∗
This paper considers the social costs implied by inefficient allocation of contracts in a first price, sealed bid procurement auction with asymmetric bidders. We adopt a constrained (piecewise linear) strategy equilibrium concept and estimate the structural parameters of the bidders’ distribution of costs. We estimate social costs defined as the predicted cost difference between the winning fir...
متن کاملA Study on the Network Governance System of Crisis Management in Tehran, Iran, Based On Participatory Governance: A Social Network Analysis
Background and objective This study aims to analyze the network governance of safety and crisis management in Tehran by examining the laws of the fourth development plan and emphasizing the participation of key actors, including government institutions, the private sector, non-governmental organizations, and local communities using social network analysis. Method In this study, 22 laws with 101...
متن کاملتأثیر توسعه موسسات مالی غیربانکی بر تولید ناخالص داخلی (GDP) در ایران )مطالعه موردی: عقود اسلامی)
Financial institution as a non-bank financial institutions, institutions that are active in mediating funds in financial markets. Services are in many ways similar to the services provided by banks. Because the relationship between the development of non-bank financial institutions and Iranian gross domestic production (GDP) seem important. In this context, the main objective of this study was ...
متن کامل