Nash Equilibria for Large-population Linear Stochastic Systems of Weakly Coupled Agents

نویسندگان

  • Minyi Huang
  • Roland P. Malhamé
  • Peter E. Caines
چکیده

We consider dynamic games in large population conditions where the agents evolve according to non-uniform dynamics and are weakly coupled via their dynamics and the individual costs. A state aggregation technique is developed to obtain a set of decentralized control laws for the individuals which possesses an ε-Nash equilibrium property. An attraction property of the mass behaviour is established. The methodology and the results contained in this paper reveal novel behavioural properties of the relationship of any given individual with respect to the mass of individuals in large-scale noncooperative systems of weakly coupled agents. 2

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تاریخ انتشار 2007