The standard procurement approach: first price or second price auctions
نویسنده
چکیده
Auctions are supposed to procure the best deal money can buy. Yet, practitioners who procure complex contracts by auction are well aware of some basic pitfalls. One concern is that winning bids may not reflect the quality of the bidder but strategic behavior like low-balling bids or underestimating costs. Such behavior may then lead to demands for contract renegotiation by the winning bidder that are hard to resist. The problem plagues complex contracts for civil works or equipment as well as contracts for various types of public-private partnerships.
منابع مشابه
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