A Smuggling Game with the Secrecy of Smuggler’s Information
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper deals with a smuggling game with multiple stages, in which Customs and a smuggler participate. Customs and the smuggler are allowed to take an action of patrol and smuggling, respectively, within the limited number of chances. Customs obtains reward by the capture of the smuggler and the smuggler gets reward by the success of smuggling. The reward or the payoff of the game is brought at each stage and is assumed to be zero-sum. Almost all past researches modeled their games by the socalled complete information game and they assumed that each player knows the past strategies taken by his opponent or never knows them. Recently, we recognize that information is crucial to the results of the games. In this paper, we deal with a smuggling game with incomplete information, where information acquisition is asymmetric between players and is disadvantageous to Customs, and we evaluate the value of information by developing a computational methodology to derive Bayesian equilibrium.
منابع مشابه
A smuggling game with asymmetrical information of players
This paper deals with a smuggling game with multiple stages. Customs is allowed to patrol within the limited number of chances and obtain reward by the capture of a smuggler. The smuggler gets a reward depending on the amount of contraband he succeeds to ship in smuggling at each stage. The pay-off of the game is zero-sum. In almost all past studies, they adopt the alternative of smuggling or n...
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