Schulze and Ranked - Pairs Voting Are Fixed - Parameter
نویسندگان
چکیده
Schulze and ranked-pairs elections have received attention recently, with the former having quickly become a widely used election system. For many cases these systems have been proven resistant to bribery, control, and manipulation, with ranked pairs being particularly praised for being NPhard for all three of those. Nonetheless, this work shows that with respect to the number of candidates, both Schulze and ranked-pairs elections are fixed-parameter tractable to bribe, control, and manipulate: we can obtain uniform, polynomial-time algorithms whose degree does not depend on the number of candidates.
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