Endogenous assembly rules, senior agenda power, and incumbency advantage∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study repeated legislative bargaining in an assembly that chooses its bargaining rules endogenously, and whose members face an election after each legislative term. An agenda protocol or bargaining rule assigns to each legislator a probability of being recognized to make a policy proposal in the assembly. We predict that the agenda protocol chosen in equilibrium disproportionately favors more senior legislators, granting them greater opportunities to make policy proposals, and it generates an incumbency advantage to all legislators.
منابع مشابه
Endogenous agendas and seniority advantage∗
We study a legislative assembly that chooses its agenda protocol endogenously. We generalize McKelvey and Riezman’s (1992) seminal theory on seniority in legislatures, by allowing for a large class of ordinal agenda rules that assign different recognition probability to each legislator. We consider two stages — the selection of agenda rules, and the decision making that transpires under them. W...
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