The Covered Response Ultimatum Game
نویسندگان
چکیده
We report an experiment on the covered response ultimatum game, in which the proposer is not informed about the responder’s reaction to an unequal offer. In this game, no education of proposers is possible. A control experiment with informed proposers was also conducted. We observe high rejection rates with covered response. These are explained by responders’ resistance to unfairness. But the rejection rates are lower than in the control group, due to the lacking possibility of educative punishment. Proposers in the open response treatment test responders’ propensity to reject by making more unequal offers. We conclude that both resistance to unfairness and educative punishment are determinants of behaviour, but neither is sufficient on its own. JEL classifications: C78, C91, C92, D82
منابع مشابه
Rejection of unfair offers in the ultimatum game is no evidence of strong reciprocity.
The strong reciprocity model of the evolution of human cooperation has gained some acceptance, partly on the basis of support from experimental findings. The observation that unfair offers in the ultimatum game are frequently rejected constitutes an important piece of the experimental evidence for strong reciprocity. In the present study, we have challenged the idea that the rejection response ...
متن کاملReferences Abbink, Klaus, Abdolkarim Sadrieh, and Shmuel Zamir. 1999. The covered response ultimatum game, UniversitÄat Bonn, SFB discussion paper B-416.
Abbink, Klaus, Abdolkarim Sadrieh, and Shmuel Zamir. 1999. The covered response ultimatum game, UniversitÄat Bonn, SFB discussion paper B-416. Abbink, Klaus, Gary E. Bolton, Abdolkarim Sadrieh, and Fang-Fang Tang. 2001. Adaptive learning versus punishment in ultimatum bargaining. Games and Economic Behavior, 37, 1{26. Abreu, Dilip, and Hitoshi Matsushima. 1992a. Virtual implementation in iterat...
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