The Relevance of Equal Splits in Ultimatum Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this note we present a slightly altered version of the mini ultimatum game of G. E. Bolton and R. Zwick (1995, Games Econ. Behav. 10, 95–121). More specifically, we replaced exactly equal splits by nearly equal splits either (slightly) favoring the proposer or the responder. Such a minor change should not matter if behavior was robust. We find, however, a significant change in behavior: Fair offers occur less often when equal splits are replaced by nearly equal splits. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C78, C92. 2001 Academic Press
منابع مشابه
The relevance of equal splits On a behavioral discontinuity in ultimatum games
The ndings on the ultimatum game are considered as belonging to the most robust experimental results. In this paper we present a slightly altered version of the mini ultimatum game of Bolton and Zwick (1995). Whereas in the latter exactly equal splits were feasible in our games these were replaced by nearly equal splits favoring (slightly) the proposer in one version and the responder in a seco...
متن کاملRelative versus Absolute Speed of Adjustment in Strategic Environments: Responder Behavior in Ultimatum Games
Models of learning have provided a unified explanation of a wide variety of experimentally observed behavior. One of the subtle predictions of learning models is that the relative speed at which different players in a game adjust their behavior when they are inexperienced may have a critical influence on the long term behavior in the game. This is how learning models account for the characteris...
متن کاملBargaining, interdependence, and the rationality of fair division
We consider two-person bargaining games with interdependent preferences and bilateral incomplete information. We show that in both the ultimatum game and the two-stage alternating-offers game, our equilibrium predictions are consistent with a number of robust experimental regularities that falsify the standard game-theoretic model: occurrence of disagreements, disadvantageous counteroffers, and...
متن کاملAn Aspirations Model of Decisions in a Class of Ultimatum Games
We propose a novel model of aspiration levels for interactive games, termed economic harmony. The model posits that the individuals' levels of outcome satisfaction are proportional to their actual outcomes relative to their aspired outcomes. We define a state of harmony as a state at which the interacting players' levels of outcome satisfaction are equal, and underscore the necessary condition ...
متن کاملFive-year-olds understand fair as equal in a mini-ultimatum game.
In studies of children's resource distribution, it is almost always the case that "fair" means an equal amount for all. In the mini-ultimatum game, players are confronted with situations in which fair does not always mean equal, and so the recipient of an offer needs to take into account the alternatives the proposer had available to her or him. Because of its forced-choice design, the mini-ult...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید
ثبت ناماگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید
ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 37 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2001