Highway toll pricing

نویسندگان

  • Baomin Dong
  • Guixia Guo
  • Yuntong Wang
چکیده

For a tolled highway where consecutive sections allow vehicles enter and exit unrestrictedly, we propose a simple toll pricing method. We show that the method is the unique method that satisfies the classical axioms of Additivity and Dummy in the cost sharing literature, and the axioms of Toll Upper Bound for Local Traffic and Routingproofness. We also show that the toll pricing method is the only method satisfying Routing-proofness and Cost Recovery. The main axiom in the characterizations is Routing-proofness which says that no vehicle can reduce its toll charges by exiting and re-entering intermediately. In the special case when there is only one unit of traffic (vehicle) for each (feasible) pair of entrance and exit, we show that our toll pricing method is the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) of an associated game to the problem. In the case when there is one unit of traffic entering at each entrance but they all exit at the last exit, our toll pricing method coincides with the well-known airport landing fee solution-the Sequential Equal Contribution rule of Littlechild and Owen (1973).

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • European Journal of Operational Research

دوره 220  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2012