Price of Anarchy of Innovation Diffusion in Social Networks
نویسندگان
چکیده
There have been great efforts in studying the cascading behavior in social networks such as the innovation diffusion, etc. Game theoretically, in a social network where individuals choose from two strategies: A (the innovation) and B (the status quo) and get payoff from their neighbors for coordination, it has long been known that the Price of Anarchy (PoA) of this game is not 1, since the Nash equilibrium (NE) where all players take B (B Nash) is inferior to the one all players taking A (A Nash). However, no quantitative analysis has been performed to give an accurate upper bound of PoA in this game. In this paper, we adopt a widely used networked coordination game setting [3] to study how bad a Nash equilibrium can be and give a tight upper bound of the PoA of such games. We show that there is an NE that is slightly worse than the B Nash. On the other hand, the PoA is bounded and the worst NE cannot be much worse than the B Nash. In addition, we discuss how the PoA upper bound would change when compatibility between A and B is introduced, and show an intuitive result that the upper bound strictly decreases as the compatibility is increased.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- CoRR
دوره abs/1407.7319 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2014