East Asian Currency Union

This paper analyzes the feasibility of various types of currency unions, such as a dollar bloc, Euro bloc, Yen bloc, and basket currency bloc in East Asia, and empirically estimates welfare effects of a currency union for East Asian economies. Judging from optimum currency area (OCA) criteria, including the symmetry of output and price shocks across countries, commitment to price stability, and trade and financial integration, East Asia does not appear to have very favorable economic conditions for a currency union, particularly when compared to the euro area. The low political proximity between Japan and other East Asian economies restricts Japan’s leadership in the creation of an East Asian currency union. Calibrations of a representative agent model suggest that, for most countries in East Asia, a currency union involving a broad group of economies would generate net welfare gain. However, if the increased volatility due to the loss of monetary policy independence incurs a significantly negative effect on growth, the larger East Asian economies such as China, Indonesia, Japan, and Korea may suffer from net welfare loss. A substantial welfare gain from joining an East Asian currency union would occur if a currency union lowers the probability and size of disasters such as wars and financial crises in East Asia. * We are grateful to Jeffrey Frankel, Ross Garnaut, Yunjong Wang, and seminar participants at the 2006 American Economic Association annual meeting and the Australian National University for helpful comments, and Jong Suk Han and Joo Hyun Pyun for able research assistance.