On the Revelation Principle and Reciprocal Mechanisms in Competing Mechanism Games
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper shows how to characterize the set of outcomes functions that can be supported as equilibrium outcome functions in competing mechanism games. We describe a set of mechanisms we refer to as reciprocal mechanisms. It is show that the set of outcome functions supportable as equilibria in a game in which principals offer reciprocal mechanisms is the same as the set of outcomes supportable by a centralized mechaism designer. It is then shown that any outcome function that can be supported as an equilibrium outcome in any competing mechanism game can also be supported as an equilibrium outcome function in a game in which all players offer reciprocal mechanisms. In this equilibrium, all players offer the same reciprocal mechanism which implements a collection of direct mechanisms in which players report their payoff types truthfully to other players.
منابع مشابه
Reciprocal contracting
This paper models competing mechanism games as extensive games where the extensive form is incompletely understood by a modeler, typically because the modeler doesn’t see all the messages that are being exchanged and doesn’t understand all the contracts that can be enforced. For this reason, the revelation principle can’t be used to characterize supportable outcomes. The paper provides a relati...
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