Algorithms for Optimizing Leveled Commitment Contracts

نویسندگان

  • Tuomas Sandholm
  • Sandeep Sikka
  • Samphel Norden
چکیده

In automated negotiation systems consisting of self-interested agents, contracts have traditionally been binding. Leveled commitment contracts i.e. contracts where each party can decommit by paying a predetermined penalty were recently shown to improve Pareto efficiency even if agents rationally decommit in Nash equilibrium using inflated thresholds on how good their outside offers must be before they decommit. This paper operationalizes the four leveled commitment contracting protocols by presenting algorithms for using them. Algorithms are presented for computing the Nash equilibrium decomitting thresholds and decommitting probabilities given the contract price and the penalties. Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium are analyzed. Algorithms are also presented for optimizing the contract itself (price and penalties). Existence and uniqueness of the optimum are analyzed. Using the algorithms we offer a contract optimization service on the web as part of eMediator, our next generation electronic commerce server. Finally, the algorithms are generalized to contracts involving more than two agents. ... Read complete abstract on page 2.

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Algorithms for Optimizing Leveled Commitment Contracts Algorithms for Optimizing Leveled Commitment Contracts

In automated negotiation systems consisting of self-interested agents, contracts have traditionally been binding. Leveled commitment contracts | i.e. contracts where each party can decommit by paying a predetermined penalty | were recently shown to improve Pareto ef-ciency even if agents rationally decommit in Nash equilibrium using innated thresholds on how good their outside ooers must be bef...

متن کامل

Revenue Equivalence of Leveled Commitment Contracts Revenue Equivalence of Leveled Commitment Contracts

In automated negotiation systems consisting of self-interested agents, contracts have traditionally been binding. Leveled commitment contracts | i.e. contracts where each party can decommit by paying a predetermined penalty|were recently shown to improve expected social welfare even if agents decommit insincerely in Nash equilibrium. Such contracts diier based on whether agents have to declare ...

متن کامل

Leveled Commitment Contracts with Myopic and Strategic Agents

In automated negotiation systems consisting of self-interested agents, contracts have traditionally been binding, i.e., impossible to breach. Such contracts do not allow the agents to e$ciently deal with future events. This de"ciency can be tackled by using a leveled commitment contracting protocol which allows the agents to decommit from contracts by paying a monetary penalty to the contractin...

متن کامل

Leveled Commitment Contracting among Myopic Individually Rational Agents

In automated negotiation systems consisting of selfinterested agents, contracts have traditionally been binding, i.e., impossible to breach. Such contracts do not allow the agents to act e ciently upon future events. A leveled commitment protocol allows the agents to decommit from contracts by paying a monetary penalty to the contracting partner. The e ciency of such protocols depends heavily o...

متن کامل

Revenue Equivalence of Leveled Commitment Contracts

In automated negotiation systems consisting of self-interested agents, contracts have traditionally been binding. Leveled commitment contracts i.e. contracts where each party can decommit by paying a predetermined penalty were recently shown to improve expected social welfare even if agents decommit insincerely in Nash equilibrium. Such contracts differ based on whether agents have to declare t...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 1999