House allocation with existing tenants: A characterization
نویسندگان
چکیده
Article history: Received 19 February 2007 Available online 30 October 2009 JEL classification: C78 D70 D78
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 69 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2010