Unifying preference and judgment aggregation
نویسنده
چکیده
The paper proposes a unification of the two main frameworks commonly used for the analysis of collective decision-making: the framework of preference aggregation, developed from the seminal work of K. Arrow on social choice theory; and the more recent framework of judgment aggregation. Such unification provides several original insights on collective decision-making problems. The methods used are based on logic and, in particular, on formal semantics.
منابع مشابه
Arrow's theorem in judgment aggregation
In response to recent work on the aggregation of individual judgments on logically connected propositions into collective judgments, it is often asked whether judgment aggregation is a special case of Arrowian preference aggregation. We argue the opposite. After proving a general impossibility result on judgment aggregation, we construct an embedding of preference aggregation into judgment aggr...
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