Simulation Models Of Two Duopoly Games
نویسنده
چکیده
The paper presents simulation of two classic duopoly games, those of Cournot and Bertrand. The simulation is done with a very simple Discrete Event Simulation system, aGPSS, developed for economics students. With the Cournot model one can study under which conditions the Cournot solution will be obtained even if the parties lack knowledge about demand and costs. The Bertrand model, with stochastic demand, allows the study of cases when a firm can charge a higher price than the other firm and yet sell because the firm charging a lower price sells more than it has expected.
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