Competing Non and For-pro...t ...rms (Preliminary and Incomplete)
نویسنده
چکیده
When employees care about the level of service provision or its quality, they may be motivated to perform tasks beyond their strict job description. But such care only motivates e¤ort if workers believe it will have an impact, i.e., when what they does ‘matters’ for output, and will not do so to enhance pro...ts. Since nonpro...t status means that management is not directly concerned with pro...t, or not answerable to owners with such concerns, it allows management to more easily commit to a form of non-interference and ensures workers’ e¤orts ‘matter’ for that which they care. Nonpro...t ...rms can thus motivate their work force in a way that for-pro...t ...rms cannot match. However, for-pro...t ...rms also have well-known advantages arising from residual claimancy. This study establishes how nonpro...t and for-pro...t ...rms will behave in sectors where they co-exist. It predicts that: nonpro...t ...rms will employ fewer supervisory resources than their for-pro...t counterparts; nonpro...t ...rms will pay equivalent quality workers more, on average, than for-pro...t ...rms, but, somewhat paradoxically, nonpro...t ...rms will obtain more ‘donated labour’ e¤ort from their workers than for-pro...t ...rms. These results are consistent with a set of ...ndings reported by Mocan and Tekin (2000) obtained from an extraordinarily detailed data set for US child-care workers that provided the ...rst direct test of ‘labour donations’.
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