Savings in Combinatorial Auctions Through Transformation Relationships

نویسندگان

  • Andrea Giovannucci
  • Jesús Cerquides
  • Juan A. Rodríguez-Aguilar
چکیده

In a previous work we extended the notion of multi-unit combinatorial reverse auction (MUCRA) by adding a new dimension to the goods at auction. A buyer can express transformability relationships among goods: some goods can be transformed into others at a transformation cost. Through this new auction type, a buyer can find out what goods to buy, to whom, and what transformations to apply to the acquired goods in order to obtain the best savings. The main focus of the paper is to perform some preliminary experiments to quantitatively assess the potential savings that a buying agent may obtain in considering transformation

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تاریخ انتشار 2006