Sequential Equilibria of Multi-Stage Games with Innite Sets of Types and Actions
نویسندگان
چکیده
Abstract: We consider how to extend Kreps and Wilsons 1982 de nition of sequential equilibrium to multi-stage games with in nite sets of types and actions. A concept of open sequential equilibrium is de ned by taking limits of strategy pro les that can consistently satisfy approximate sequential rationality for all players at arbitrarily large nite collections of observable open events. Existence of open sequential equilibria is shown for a broad class of regular projective games. Examples are considered to illustrate the properties of this solution and the di¢ culties of alternative approaches to the problem of extending sequential equilibrium to in nite games.
منابع مشابه
Sequential Equilibrium in Multi-Stage Games with Innite Sets of Types and Actions
Abstract: We consider the question of how to de ne sequential equilibria for multistage games with in nite type sets and in nite action sets. The de nition should be a natural extension of Kreps and Wilsons 1982 de nition for nite games, should yield intuitively appropriate solutions for various examples, and should exist for a broad class of economically interesting games.
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