Characterizations of the position value for hypergraph communication situations
نویسندگان
چکیده
We characterize the position value for arbitrary hypergraph communication situations. The position value is first presented by the Shapley value of the uniform hyperlink game or the k-augmented uniform hyperlink game, which are obtained from the given hypergraph communication situation. These results generalize the non-axiomatic characterization of the position value for communication situations in Kongo (2010) (Int J Game Theory (2010) 39: 669–675) to hypergraph communication situations. Based on the non-axiomatic characterization, we further provide an axiomatic characterization of the position value for arbitrary hypergraph communication situations by employing component efficiency and a new property, named partial balanced conference contributions. The partial balanced conference contributions is developed from balanced link contributions in Slikker (2005) (Int J Game Theory (2005) 33: 505-514).
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