Legislative Productivity and Divided Government in the US and France

Comparing rates of legislative productivity in periods of unified and divided control of the executive and legislative branches in the US and France, we show first that the concept of ―divided government‖ is more complicated than scholars have allowed. In the US, truly unified government, where the president enjoys a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate as well as a majority in the House, is rare. Therefore the normal state of affairs it at least some degree of shared governance. In France, truly unified government has been more common (but only for parties of the right, as the Senate has never had a left majority in the 5th Republic), but divided government has also been common. Strongly unified government in the US appears to be statistically related with slightly greater legislative productivity. However the effect is modest and other levels of divided control have no statistical impact. Similarly in France, there is almost no impact on the number of laws, important laws, or laws in the field of domestic or foreign affairs. Of course, divided government may shape the content of laws as competing actors must compromise. But as regards productivity, there is little effect. Democratic governance requires that parties address important issues and they do so regardless of partisan majorities.