Optimal Voting Rules When Voting is Costly - Sequentiality, Default Choices and Committees
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study costly voting as a dynamic mechanism design problem and identify three characteristics of any optimal mechanism in a highly stylized setting: (1) sequential participation decisions, (2) interpreting non-participation as a vote for some default, and (3) delegating the vote to a committee that excludes some voters.
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