Modeling of the channel-hopping anti-jamming defense in multi-radio wireless networks

Multi-radio (multi-interface, multi-channel) 802.11 and sensor networks have been proposed to increase network capacity and to reduce energy consumption, to name only a few of their applications. They are vulnerable, however, to jamming attacks, in which attackers block communication by radio interference or MAC-protocol violation. Two jamming countermeasures have been proposed, namely software-based channel hopping and error-correcting codes. In this paper, we introduce the problem of maximizing network goodput under jamming attacks through a combination of channel hopping and error-correction coding. We describe the solution space and investigate one point thereof, namely reactive defense against scanning attack. We develop a Markovian model of the reactive channel-hopping defense against the scanning jamming attack and validate it using simulation experiments. Our results suggest that an adaptive defense, based on our model, would improve the resiliency of multi-radio networks against jamming.